I N T R E P X

Chapter 4 of “Folly and Glory” by Tim Weiner delves into the covert operations and clandestine activities conducted by the CIA and the KGB during the early Cold War. As the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union intensified, both superpowers increasingly relied on their intelligence agencies to wage a shadow war that spanned the globe. Weiner examines the key operations, the motivations behind them, and the impact these covert actions had on international relations and the internal politics of various countries.

1. The Strategy of Covert Action:
Weiner begins the chapter by outlining the strategic importance of covert actions during the Cold War. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were keen to avoid direct military confrontation, which could escalate into a nuclear war. Instead, they resorted to covert operations as a means to influence global affairs without provoking open conflict. The CIA, under the directive of U.S. Presidents, conducted operations aimed at destabilizing communist governments, supporting pro-Western regimes, and gathering intelligence on Soviet activities. Similarly, the KGB carried out missions to support communist movements, disrupt Western alliances, and expand Soviet influence.

The chapter emphasizes that covert actions were seen as a cost-effective way to achieve geopolitical objectives. However, these operations often had unintended consequences, leading to long-term instability and resentment in the affected regions.

2. The Iranian Coup of 1953:
One of the most significant early covert operations conducted by the CIA was the overthrow of Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, in 1953. Mossadegh had nationalized the Iranian oil industry, which was previously controlled by British interests, leading to a standoff with the West. Weiner describes how the CIA, in collaboration with the British intelligence agency MI6, orchestrated Operation Ajax to remove Mossadegh from power and reinstate the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was seen as more amenable to Western interests.

The operation involved a complex mix of propaganda, bribery, and orchestrated protests to destabilize Mossadegh’s government. The coup was successful, and the Shah was restored to power, cementing U.S. influence in Iran for the next two decades. However, Weiner notes that this action sowed deep-seated resentment among Iranians towards the U.S., which later contributed to the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the long-lasting animosity between the two nations.

3. The Guatemalan Coup of 1954:
The chapter then shifts to Guatemala, where the CIA executed a similar operation in 1954 to overthrow President Jacobo Árbenz. Árbenz had implemented land reforms that threatened the interests of the United Fruit Company, a major American corporation with significant influence in Washington. The U.S. government, concerned about the potential spread of communism in Latin America, viewed Árbenz’s reforms as evidence of Soviet influence.

Through Operation PBSUCCESS, the CIA organized a coup that involved training and supporting a small rebel force, broadcasting propaganda, and intimidating the Guatemalan military into withdrawing support for Árbenz. The coup succeeded with relatively little bloodshed, but the installation of a military dictatorship in Guatemala led to decades of political instability, human rights abuses, and civil war. Weiner highlights how these actions in Iran and Guatemala set a precedent for the CIA’s involvement in regime change throughout the Cold War, often prioritizing U.S. corporate and strategic interests over the democratic aspirations of other nations.

4. The Hungarian Uprising and the Limits of Covert Action:
Weiner discusses the Hungarian Uprising of 1956 as a turning point that revealed the limits of U.S. covert actions. Encouraged by U.S. rhetoric promoting freedom and resistance against communist oppression, Hungarian citizens rose up against Soviet control. However, when the uprising was met with brutal Soviet military intervention, the U.S. and its allies chose not to intervene militarily, fearing escalation into a broader conflict with the Soviet Union.

The chapter underscores the disconnect between the U.S.’s covert propaganda efforts, which encouraged resistance in Eastern Europe, and the reality of geopolitical constraints that prevented direct intervention. The Hungarian Uprising demonstrated that while covert operations could destabilize governments, they could not always achieve broader strategic goals, especially in areas firmly within the Soviet sphere of influence.

5. The Suez Crisis and the CIA’s Global Reach:
The Suez Crisis of 1956 is examined as another example of Cold War complexities involving covert operations and international diplomacy. When Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, Britain, France, and Israel launched a military intervention to seize control of the canal. The U.S., under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, was caught off guard by the invasion, as it had not been informed by its allies.

Weiner explains that the CIA was involved in monitoring the situation, but the U.S. ultimately opposed the intervention, fearing that it would push Arab nations closer to the Soviet Union. The crisis ended with the withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli forces under U.S. pressure, marking a decline in European colonial influence in the Middle East and highlighting the growing influence of the superpowers in regional conflicts.

6. Covert Operations in Southeast Asia:
The chapter details the CIA’s expanding role in Southeast Asia, particularly in Laos and Vietnam, as the U.S. sought to prevent the spread of communism in the region. In Laos, the CIA supported anti-communist forces against the Pathet Lao, a communist group backed by North Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Weiner describes how the CIA’s efforts included not only funding and arming local militias but also running a secret air force, Air America, to conduct supply missions and airstrikes.

In Vietnam, the CIA’s involvement grew as the U.S. increased its commitment to supporting the South Vietnamese government against the communist North. The chapter explores early covert actions that laid the groundwork for the eventual full-scale military intervention by the U.S., including the use of propaganda, sabotage, and support for anti-communist leaders. Weiner highlights that these actions were part of a broader U.S. strategy of containment, but they also set the stage for a protracted and costly conflict.

7. The Bay of Pigs Invasion:
Weiner examines the Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961 as a stark example of the failures and risks associated with covert operations. The CIA planned and executed an invasion of Cuba by a group of Cuban exiles aimed at overthrowing Fidel Castro’s communist government. The operation was poorly conceived and executed, leading to a quick defeat of the invading forces by Castro’s troops.

The Bay of Pigs debacle was a major embarrassment for the Kennedy administration and significantly damaged U.S. credibility. Weiner argues that the failure highlighted the dangers of relying on covert operations as a substitute for clear and achievable foreign policy objectives. It also reinforced Castro’s alignment with the Soviet Union, leading directly to the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, one of the most dangerous moments of the Cold War.

Conclusion:
Chapter 4 of “Folly and Glory” illustrates how the CIA and KGB’s covert operations became critical tools in the superpowers’ struggle for global influence during the early Cold War. Weiner demonstrates that while these operations were often seen as necessary to counter the other side’s actions and prevent the spread of opposing ideologies, they frequently led to unintended and sometimes disastrous consequences. The chapter underscores the complexity and moral ambiguity of using covert action as a means of achieving foreign policy goals, highlighting both the successes and failures that characterized this hidden aspect of the Cold War.