I N T R E P X

Chapter 6 of “Folly and Glory” by Tim Weiner examines the Vietnam War, focusing on the challenges the United States faced as it became increasingly entangled in Southeast Asia. This chapter explores how the U.S. strategy of containment and the domino theory—believing that the fall of one country to communism would lead to the spread of communism throughout the region—drove American involvement in Vietnam. Weiner provides an in-depth look at the political, military, and intelligence failures that defined the U.S. experience in Vietnam and how this conflict tested the limits of American power and resolve.

1. The Roots of American Involvement:
Weiner begins by tracing the roots of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, which escalated after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. The Geneva Accords temporarily divided Vietnam at the 17th parallel, with communist forces under Ho Chi Minh controlling the North and the anti-communist government led by Ngo Dinh Diem in the South. The U.S. supported Diem’s regime as a bulwark against communism, providing economic and military aid.

Despite significant American support, Diem’s government was deeply unpopular due to corruption, repression, and poor governance. Weiner explains how the U.S. backed the South Vietnamese government even as it struggled to gain legitimacy and support from its own people, leading to growing instability and insurgency by the communist Viet Cong.

2. Escalation Under Kennedy and Johnson:
The chapter explores the escalation of U.S. involvement under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. Kennedy initially increased American military advisors in Vietnam, hoping to build up South Vietnamese forces through the Strategic Hamlet Program and counterinsurgency tactics. However, these efforts largely failed to curb the growing strength of the Viet Cong.

After Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, Johnson inherited the Vietnam dilemma and faced the challenge of demonstrating American resolve against communism without triggering a wider war. Weiner details how the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964—where North Vietnamese forces allegedly attacked U.S. naval vessels—served as a pretext for Johnson to secure congressional approval for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, effectively giving him broad powers to escalate U.S. military involvement.

3. The Americanization of the War:
With the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in hand, Johnson authorized a massive escalation, including the deployment of combat troops and a sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam known as Operation Rolling Thunder. Weiner discusses how this “Americanization” of the war marked a significant shift, as the conflict became increasingly seen as an American war rather than a Vietnamese one.

Despite the commitment of hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops and extensive bombing, the war did not go as planned. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong proved resilient and adaptive, using guerrilla tactics and the Ho Chi Minh trail to sustain their fight. The U.S. military struggled to adapt to the unconventional nature of the war, and progress on the battlefield was difficult to measure, leading to growing frustration and disillusionment within the U.S. government and among the American public.

4. Intelligence Failures and Misjudgments:
Weiner highlights significant intelligence failures and misjudgments that plagued U.S. efforts in Vietnam. American leaders often underestimated the determination of the North Vietnamese and overestimated the effectiveness of their own military strategies. The U.S. intelligence community struggled to provide accurate assessments of enemy strength and intentions, contributing to flawed decision-making.

The Tet Offensive in 1968, a massive surprise attack by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces across South Vietnam, shocked the American public and exposed the vulnerability of U.S. and South Vietnamese forces. Although militarily repulsed, the offensive was a psychological victory for the communists, further eroding American support for the war.

5. The Limits of U.S. Power and the Path to Withdrawal:
As public opinion turned against the war, Weiner describes how Johnson faced mounting pressure to de-escalate. The war had become deeply unpopular in the United States, with widespread protests, media criticism, and political opposition. Johnson announced he would not seek re-election in 1968, and his successor, Richard Nixon, promised to achieve “peace with honor.”

Weiner examines Nixon’s strategy of “Vietnamization,” which aimed to gradually withdraw U.S. troops while building up South Vietnamese forces to take over the fighting. However, even as U.S. troop levels decreased, the conflict continued with heavy casualties, and Nixon expanded the war into Cambodia and Laos, sparking further controversy and unrest at home.

6. The Fall of Saigon and the Aftermath:
The chapter concludes with the final years of the Vietnam War, detailing the 1973 Paris Peace Accords that led to the withdrawal of U.S. troops, but failed to bring lasting peace. In 1975, North Vietnamese forces captured Saigon, unifying Vietnam under communist rule and marking a humiliating end to U.S. involvement. Weiner emphasizes the lasting impact of the war, including the profound loss of life, the deep divisions it created in American society, and the sobering realization of the limits of American power.

Conclusion:
Chapter 6 of “Folly and Glory” captures the complexity of the Vietnam War as a watershed moment in U.S. history. Weiner illustrates how the war exposed the challenges of using military power to achieve political goals in a foreign land, highlighting the disconnect between U.S. objectives and the realities on the ground. The chapter serves as a critical reflection on the broader themes of Cold War interventionism, the dangers of flawed intelligence, and the consequences of overreach, ultimately questioning the efficacy of American foreign policy during this tumultuous period.