I N T R E P X

Chapter 7 of “Folly and Glory” by Tim Weiner explores the foreign policy strategies of President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, as they navigated the complex global landscape of the early 1970s. This chapter focuses on their efforts to reshape American diplomacy through realpolitik—pragmatic, power-centered approaches to international relations—emphasizing the importance of détente with the Soviet Union, opening relations with China, and redefining U.S. involvement in the Cold War. Weiner highlights the successes, missteps, and long-term implications of Nixon and Kissinger’s foreign policy maneuvers.

1. Détente with the Soviet Union:
Weiner begins by examining Nixon and Kissinger’s strategy of détente, aimed at reducing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. They sought to move away from the confrontational policies of the past and instead pursued a more nuanced approach that involved negotiation, arms control, and economic engagement.

Key to this strategy was the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) treaty in 1972, which marked the first major agreement between the superpowers to limit their nuclear arsenals. This was complemented by the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which restricted the development of missile defense systems, thus maintaining the doctrine of mutually assured destruction as a deterrent to nuclear war.

Weiner describes how these agreements were seen as significant achievements in managing the nuclear arms race and reducing the risk of direct conflict. However, he also notes that détente had its critics, who argued that it conceded too much to the Soviet Union without adequately addressing human rights abuses or Soviet expansionism.

2. Opening Relations with China:
One of Nixon’s most groundbreaking moves was his decision to open diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, a strategic realignment that fundamentally altered the Cold War dynamic. Weiner details the secret preparations and eventual breakthrough, including Nixon’s historic 1972 visit to Beijing, where he met with Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai.

This rapprochement with China was motivated by a desire to exploit the Sino-Soviet split and gain leverage over the Soviet Union. By engaging with China, Nixon and Kissinger hoped to create a triangular diplomacy that would allow the U.S. to play off the two communist powers against each other. This move also positioned the U.S. to influence global affairs in Asia more effectively, while countering Soviet influence in the region.

Weiner emphasizes that the opening of China was a masterstroke of diplomacy, transforming a previously hostile relationship into one of cautious cooperation. It also paved the way for China’s eventual economic integration into the global economy, though Weiner notes that this shift was not without its complications, including ongoing disagreements over Taiwan and human rights issues.

3. Middle East Diplomacy and the Yom Kippur War:
The chapter also explores Nixon and Kissinger’s involvement in the Middle East, particularly during the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Weiner describes how the conflict between Israel and a coalition of Arab states, led by Egypt and Syria, presented both a challenge and an opportunity for U.S. foreign policy.

Kissinger, who served as both Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, played a pivotal role in navigating the crisis. He orchestrated an airlift of supplies to Israel, helping to turn the tide of the war, while simultaneously engaging in shuttle diplomacy to negotiate a ceasefire. This intervention not only solidified U.S. support for Israel but also opened the door for future peace negotiations between Israel and its neighbors.

Weiner points out that while the U.S. emerged as a key power broker in the Middle East, the war also led to an oil embargo by Arab nations, triggering a global energy crisis that underscored the vulnerabilities of American dependence on foreign oil. This episode highlighted the interconnectedness of global events and the limits of U.S. influence, even when achieving short-term diplomatic successes.

4. The Chilean Coup and Covert Operations:
Weiner critically examines Nixon and Kissinger’s use of covert operations, particularly in Chile, where they supported the overthrow of the democratically elected socialist president, Salvador Allende, in 1973. Viewing Allende’s government as a potential ally of the Soviet Union, Nixon and Kissinger authorized the CIA to destabilize the Chilean economy and back opposition forces, culminating in a military coup led by General Augusto Pinochet.

The coup in Chile is depicted as a clear example of the darker side of Nixon and Kissinger’s foreign policy, where strategic interests often trumped democratic principles. While the U.S. succeeded in preventing a leftist government in Chile, it did so at the cost of supporting a brutal dictatorship that engaged in widespread human rights abuses.

Weiner argues that such interventions damaged the U.S.’s reputation globally and contributed to a legacy of distrust and resentment in Latin America. This part of the chapter underscores the moral and ethical complexities of realpolitik, where the pursuit of strategic goals frequently led to controversial and morally ambiguous actions.

5. The Decline of Détente and Domestic Turmoil:
As the chapter progresses, Weiner discusses the decline of détente in the late 1970s, as both superpowers grew disillusioned with the limitations of the policy. The Soviet Union continued its support for communist movements around the world, while the U.S. struggled with domestic challenges, including the Watergate scandal, which ultimately led to Nixon’s resignation in 1974.

Weiner notes that the Watergate scandal not only crippled Nixon’s presidency but also weakened American credibility and leadership on the global stage. The ensuing political turmoil made it difficult for the U.S. to maintain its strategic focus, and by the time Gerald Ford and later Jimmy Carter took office, the momentum of détente had largely dissipated.

Conclusion:
Chapter 7 of “Folly and Glory” highlights the complexities of Nixon and Kissinger’s foreign policy, characterized by bold diplomatic initiatives, pragmatic maneuvering, and significant ethical compromises. Weiner illustrates how their strategies reshaped the Cold War landscape, achieving notable successes such as opening relations with China and arms control with the Soviet Union, while also revealing the inherent contradictions and limits of their approach.

The chapter underscores the impact of realpolitik on U.S. foreign policy, showing how the pursuit of national interests often conflicted with American ideals of democracy and human rights. Weiner concludes that while Nixon and Kissinger left a lasting mark on global diplomacy, their legacy is one of both triumphs and troubling consequences, reflecting the broader challenges of navigating the Cold War’s global chessboard.